Capabilities to exchange health information are critical to accelerate discovery and its diffusion to healthcare practice. However, the same ethical and legal policies that protect privacy hinder these data exchanges, and the issues accumulate if moving data across geographical or organizational borders. This can be seen as one of the reasons why many health technologies and research findings are limited to very narrow domains. In this paper, we compare how using and disclosing personal data for research purposes is addressed in Australian, Austrian, Finnish, Swiss, and US policies with a focus on text data analytics. Our goal is to identify approaches and issues that enable or hinder international health information exchanges. As expected, the policies within each country are not as diverse as across countries. Most policies apply the principles of accountability and/or adequacy and are thereby fundamentally similar. Their following requirements create complications with re-using and re-disclosing data and even secondary data: 1) informing data subjects about the purposes of data collection and use, before the dataset is collected; 2) assurance that the subjects are no longer identifiable; and 3) destruction of data when the research activities are finished. Using storage and compute cloud services as well as other exchange technologies on the Internet without proper permissions is technically not allowed if the data are stored in another country. Both legislation and technologies are available as vehicles for overcoming these barriers. The resulting richness in information variety will contribute to the development and evaluation of new clinical hypotheses and technologies.
INTRODUCTION
Health information includes all health-related content from all specialties, organizations, regions, territories, and countries. Examples include private personal data on electronic health records (EHRs) as well as health sciences papers and other publicly-available information on the Internet. Their electronic recording enables data to become potentially accessible through information and communications technologies (ICT) for the purposes of improving health and healthcare. These benefits are typically reached through supporting situational awareness, decision-making, and knowledge discovery, as is illustrated by the increasing popularity of text data analytics [1] [2] [3] .
However, this promise only holds if the potential benefits outweigh the risks [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . A major risk of compromising data subjects' privacy is particularly evident in analyzing text (i.e., inabilities to be fully convinced that all privacy-sensitive information has been deidentified both in the explicit text and in between its lines) or big data (i.e., unforeseen possibilities to infer personal data after record linkages from multiple de-identified sources); health information may contain patients or healthcare workers' personal data such as identifiers, care details, and other sensitive matters.
Consequently, storing and using them requires careful compliance with jurisdictional legislation, governance, and policies, for record/register research. To ICT , and processing of personal data with specific sections on processing of personal data concerning health and processing for historical, statistical, and scientific research purposes [9] . The most widely used legal frameworks in EHR information exchanges are the EC and US frameworks from 1995 and 2002, respectively [10] .
METHODS
We addressed this information exchange problem from an international perspective by comparing Australian, Austrian, Finnish, Swiss, and US frameworks by extending a paper on Australian and Finnish frameworks [9] . We chose these countries to cover America, Australia, EU (Austria and Finland members since 1995), and non-EU Europe (Switzerland).
We extracted the relevant legal frameworks from online databases of the legislative and other judicial information of Australia, Australian New South Wales (NSW), Austria, EU, Finland, Switzerland, Swiss Valais, the USA, and the US California, supplemented with information available on the websites of the jurisdictional ethics boards. We included both general frameworks for privacy protection and health specific ones.
For each country, we addressed the following research questions: What are the relevant legal frameworks? How can the process of gaining access to authentic health information be characterized in terms of ethics approvals, research permissions, and data subjects' informed consenting? How can data be exchanged, combined, and compared across jurisdictional borders or from a research project to another?
RESULTS
Even though international frameworks have an increasing role and harmonizing impact over the national, territorial, regional, and organizational frameworks, the requirements for data access and protection vary in states, territories, and cantons of the five countries (Table 1) ; each region significantly adds to the frameworks by establishing their own regulations and recommendations.
The process of gaining access to authentic health information for the purposes of scientific, historical, or statistical projects is typically straightforward, well guided, and has the following five steps: First, preparations take place and include developing a research plan, forming a research group, naming its leader, and writing an ethics protocol that encompasses at least the following aspects: studying the governance, policy, and legal frameworks; assuring that the proper permissions are furnished and legislation is followed; monitoring that the permissions cover all aspects of project; specifying the purposes of data collection, including justifications for the relevance of the data to the research plan and the amount of data to be collected; specifying data collection, storage, and protection which includes data access, destruction, use, modification, and disclosure; preparing user agreements; educating the data users on research ethics; answering to questions on research ethics; monitoring that good research practice is conformed; and intervening in problems.
Second, permissions are furnished: The study is accepted by chief officers of the jurisdiction. Ethics approvals are obtained from the approving authority, except in Austria and Finland, some projects are not subject to this. Research permissions are obtained at least from the each healthcare jurisdiction where data originate (and in some cases from the highest national health-authority); they may be granted for a defined goal, specific data type and gathering interval, and limited in time (as defined in the project's ethical protocol). In Australia, Austria, and Finland, the processing of personal data is limited to purposes of health/medical sciences and historical/statistical studies. Finland requires additional research permissions from the Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and Health for projects that use personal data from more than one jurisdiction (i.e., municipality/municipality board) or from the private sector (i.e., private healthcare services or self-employed healthcare professionals). Applications are submitted for free to the Finnish National Institute for Health and Welfare and/or Finnish Medicines Agency and their review may take from three to twelve months. The Finnish Office of the Data Protection Ombudsman must be notified using a standardized form, if the project keeps a personal data register; transfers personal data to outside the EU or the European Economic Area; or launches an automated decision-support system. In Switzerland, furnishing ethics approvals and research permissions is amalgamated and examined by each larger healthcare provider and smaller canton's own ethics commission.
Third, data collection takes place for the purposes specified above. In general, the legislation in the five countries does not permit organizations to use or disclose personal data unless one or both of the following conditions applies: 1) Data subjects (the patients/customers and sometimes also the healthcare workers and informing clinicians) have been consented. 2) The use/disclosure has been specifically authorized/required by another law. In Austria, all data must be de-identified without delay so that the data subjects are no longer identifiable if specific project phases can be performed with indirectly personal data only. In Australia, this deidentification is encouraged. The USA allows researchers to access to certain de-identified health information and specifies this deidentification as follows: 1) removing all specific identifiers of the individuals and their relatives, employers, and household members or 2) obtaining a qualified statistical expert's documented opinion stating that the remaining risk of identifying an individual is very small. Data gathering and de-identification, typically by the Each IRB has its own forms.
Review times The committees meet every month.
Approximately three months starting with submission, the larger committees meet approximately ten times per year.
The committees meet once or twice a month. The research cannot be carried out without data identifying the person and the consent of the data subjects cannot be obtained owing to the quantity of the data, their age or another comparable reason; the use of the personal data file is based on an appropriate research plan and a person or a group of persons responsible for the research have been designated; the personal data file is used and data are disclosed therefrom only for purposes of historical or scientific research and the procedure followed is also otherwise such that the data pertaining to a given individual are not disclosed to outsiders; and after the personal data are no longer required for the research or for the verification of the results achieved, the personal data file is destroyed or transferred into an archive, or the data in it are altered so that the data subjects can no longer be identified.
The amount of consenting work is not in relation to the amount of protection required or many of the potential subjects' might be deceased, etc.
Limited datasets in which identifiers have been removed and situations in which it is impractical to contact data subjects.
Information exchanges possible if
The transferring agency/organization (A/O) remains accountable for these data, unless at least one of the following three conditions applies: 1) Data subjects have been consented after being expressly advised that the consequence of providing consent is that after the transfer, the A/O will no longer accountable for the individual' personal data.
2) The A/O is required or authorized by or under law to transfer the personal data.
3) The transferring A/O reasonably believes that the data recipient is subject to a law, binding scheme, or contract which effectively upholds privacy protections that are substantially similar to these principles.
At least one of the following three conditions applies: 1) Data subjects have been consented.
2) The exchange has been authorized by the Austrian Data Protection Authority.
3) Data are only indirectly personal.
2) The protection of the privacy and the rights of data subjects is guaranteed by means of contractual terms.
3) The country in question guarantees an adequate level of data protection.
Additional permission are needed for data from more than one jurisdiction or from the private sector. Fourth, research, where the transferred data are used only for the purposes specified above, takes place; otherwise Steps 1-3 must be repeated. Researchers' abilities to move and combine data across geographical or jurisdictional borders is important not only for collaborative and comparative purposes but also for availability of storage and compute cloud services (e.g., by Amazon, Dropbox, and Google): the cloud may not only forbid the storage and processing of personal data in its user agreement but also use computer servers that are physically located overseas, leading to trans-border information exchanges. In general, trans-border information exchanges are permitted with data from the five countries if it has been specifically requested in the ethics protocol and the proper permissions have been obtained. For academic partners this can, in some cases, be easier to obtain than exchanges with commercial goals.
Fifth, data destruction is performed as specified in the ethics protocol. Typically, this means deleting all data or returning it to the jurisdiction when the research activities are finished (e.g., Finland and Switzerland). Justifying the exchange of original data or even derived resources (i.e., secondary data) is often difficult, because data subjects should have been informed about all purposes of data collection and use before data collection (e.g., all our five countries) and this information disclosure can occur only after assuring that individuals are no longer identifiable (e.g., Austria, Finland, and the USA). The requirements are particularly difficult in evolving research activities and in data mining projects, where the aim is to infer new, previously unknown information from data. For example in Austria, there is currently no generally accepted process for disseminating health data from one research project to another secondary use; processes take place -so far -on an individual and case-by-case basis and many people fear that secondary use of the national EHR data could lead to unwanted transparency and serve for unwanted control purposes [11] .
DISCUSSION
The frameworks differ between the five countries and their regions, but the differences within each country are not as substantial as across countries and because most frameworks apply the principles of accountability and/or adequacy they are actually fundamentally similar. In the accountable principle, the original creator of the personal data register is accountable for regulatory compliance unless the accountabilities are specified separately, as in the APEC, Australian, and US frameworks, whilst in the adequacy principle, the subsequent information receiver must protect privacy adequately, as in the Australian and EC frameworks.
ICT can be built not only to enforce and audit compliance with all frameworks and framework updates simultaneously but also to prevent the possibility of accountability and adequacy violation in exchanging health information [12] . Building this preventative ICT that implements core privacy principles, adopts trusted network design characteristics, oversees accountability and adequacy will bolster trust in such systems and promote their adoption [13] . Such ICT for EHR exchanges between China and Japan has been introduced [14, 15] . Moreover, an access control scheme and other security designs applicable for these privacy-sensitive data have been designed for cloud computing and wireless networking [16] [17] [18] . Finally, ICT to automatically de-identify EHR text have been evaluated to reach the F1 correctness percentage from 81 to 99 in English, French, Japanese, and Swedish [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . Approximately ninety per cent of the residual identifiers left behind by either these ICT or human coders can be concealed by applying additional computation methods [25] .
However, similarly to our conclusion on differing frameworks, current ICT and architectures for health information exchanges are also very different when comparing between countries or jurisdictions [26] . Moreover, evolving healthcare and science (e.g., ICT development in non-research organizations or exchange of secondary data) and lessons learnt in information exchanges calls also for continuous improvements to enforcement mechanisms in the existing law and data subjects' consenting [13, [27] [28] [29] [30] . The attitudes of 62 US patients toward electronic health information exchanges have been studied [31] . Regardless of their enthusiasm about their capacity to improve the quality and safety of healthcare through the exchanges, they are also concerned about the potential of these exchanges to result in data misuse and compromised privacy. Consequently, they want more information about data subjects' consenting. 
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